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Book Reviews

DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE MODERNIZATION OF
AMERICAN LAW
THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: LEGAL PAPERS. ALFRED

S. KONEF-

and ANDREW J. KING, editors. University Press of New England, 1983. 2 Vols.: Vol. 1, pp. xxxix, 571; Vol. 2, Pp. XX, 694. Vol.
1, $45.00; Vol. 2, $55.00.

SKY

R. KENT NEWMYER*
"[G]eneral histories still usually ignore law as argued and adjudicated in the courts, and with few exceptions biographers of
lawyers and judges famous in their time hurry over the legal chapters in their subjects' lives in order to get them into the more familiar and, hence, more comfortable arena of politics."' So wrote
Lyman Butterfield, editor-in-chief of The Adams Papers. His observation, made with John Adams in mind, is equally true of
Daniel Webster, although Webster's reputation as a lawyer of immense ability is generally recognized, not to say unduly celebrated.
Numerous articles touching on his legal career have been written:2
there is one solid monograph devoted entirely to Webster's United
States Supreme Court practice; and, almost without exception,
*Professor of History, University of Connecticut at Storrs.
1.
2.

LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, xix (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
See, e.g., E. Wheeler, Daniel Webster, in 3 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 289-330 (D.

Lewis ed. 1908); Newmyer, Daniel Webster as Tocqueville's Lawyer: The Dartmouth College Case Again, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 127 (1967); 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 686-728 (rev. ed. 1926).
3. M. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER & THE SuPREME COURT (1966).
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general histories of the Supreme Court make some mention of
Webster's influence on American public law through his arguments
in such leading cases as Dartmouth College v. Woodward,4 Gibbons v. Ogden 5 and the Charles River Bridge6 case.
To acknowledge Webster's genius as a lawyer, however, is not
necessarily to understand it. The problem is that most of Webster's lawyering did not take place at the Supreme Court level
where most scholarly attention has been focused. Before Webster
made his debut before that Court, he had practiced extensively in
the state and lower federal courts in New England. Moreover,
Webster maintained an extensive practice in these courts even after his emergence as the leader of the Supreme Court bar and after
his decision to enter national politics. It is clear-or rather it is
made clear in these admirable volumes by Professors Konefsky
and King-that to understand Webster the lawyer, indeed Webster the politician and the man, one must understand his private
law practice.
I.
These two volumes are the first installment of a three-volume
series of the Webster Legal Papers, and as such are part of the
comprehensive Webster Papers project being conducted at
Dartmouth College under the general editorship of Charles M.
Wiltse. Volume one concerns Webster's New Hampshire practice.
It covers his legal education in Salisbury and, beginning in 1804, in
the Boston office of Christopher Gore, and then his early practice,
first in rural New Hampshire and then after 1807 in Portsmouth.
Volume two deals exclusively with Webster's Boston practice
which began in earnest when he moved there in 1816 and continued throughout his professional life. A projected third volume, edited solely by Professor King and treating primarily Webster's
practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, will complete the Legal Papers series.
Volumes one and two are organized with special attention to
the needs of researchers in early American legal history-and those
needs regarding Webster's legal career are considerable. To begin
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
5. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
6. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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with, the vast scope of the material threatens to be overwhelming.
There was rarely a time in Webster's public life when he did not
have cases pending in the courts,7 and he kept working papers for
most of them, some of which were preserved by his son and executor Fletcher Webster. From this mass of unorganized documents
the editors have culled those that are capable of yielding a representative and coherent view of Webster's practice-a feat of scholarship in itself.
Geography and chronology are the main heads of organization,
and within these care is taken to treat the various functional aspects of Webster's practice as well as the substantive legal issues
which engaged his attention. By seeing Webster the novice in rural
New Hampshire,8 as well as Webster the legal lion of commercial
Boston,9 we are able to chart his professional growth and development. We see him address juries10 and follow him in the various
phases of practice which take place prior to and outside formal
court room advocacy. And of course we see him handle the full
range of legal issues at both the trial and appellate level.1 ' In short,
the sensible design of the volumes, along with timely statistical
breakdowns of cases argued, permits the reader to make ordered
sense out of an incredibly large and diverse corpus of documents.
Without such wise editorial guidance these important sources
would be largely inaccessible except to specialists willing to spend
a lifetime in the archives.
Making the documents accessible means making them understandable, and here also the editors succeed admirably. Webster,
as he complained to his friend James Bingham in 1806, lived "a
life of writs and summonses."' 2 English common law writ pleading
was still the dominant mode of practice in early nineteenth-century New England, and the fact that each state modified this En7.

See generally, A. KONEFSKY & A. KING, THE PAPERS OF DANEL WEBSTER (1983). The

documents contained in these volumes demonstrate that from the time Webster completed
his legal studies until the time of his death, there was not a period in his life when he was
not in court.
8. 1 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 89-132.
9. 2 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 344-656.

10. Id. at 93-95.
11.

Id. at 415-527 (marine insurance), 378-415 (contract and arbitration), 345-56 (com-

mercial law), 527-64 (banking), 564-70 (property), 581-643 (federal equity jurisdiction and
remedies).
12. Letter from Daniel Webster to James Hervey Bingham (Jan. 19, 1806) in 1 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 67.
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glish inheritance by statute and practice only makes the process
more difficult to comprehend. Legal scholars as well as historians
will be grateful for the manner in which these technical aspects of
Webster's practice are presented. Concise explanatory essays are
placed in close proximity to the documents, which themselves are
arranged organically around cases and issues. When necessary, the
court structure itself is sketched out so that the institutional context of the documents is always clear. The cases in which Webster
was engaged are analyzed both in terms of the legal doctrines involved and the political and economic issues at stake. Individuals
who figure in the documents are identified when possible in footnotes and appear as well in the detailed index.
Taken together and in sequence, the explanatory essays, notable both for their clarity and scholarship, constitute a convenient
brief introduction to leading developments in American law in
early nineteenth-century New England. Reading the notes and
documents in conjunction gives the reader an intimate feeling for
the practice of law in this period. Through Webster the lawyer-as
he makes his way from Boscawen to Boston, from anonymity to
fame-we catch a glimpse of the dynamic relationship of law and
history which worked to transform New England and the nation.
II.
Webster's legal apprenticeship in rural New Hampshire is a
convenient benchmark from which to measure the magnitude of
this transformation. The mode of learning law, as well as the law
he learned in the law office of Thomas W. Thompson beginning in
the fall of 1801, were essentially colonial in nature-a point which
the editors make vivid by parallel quotations on legal education
from William Livingston in 1745 and Josiah Quincy in 1832.3 Ap13. Id. at 3. Livingston is quoted as saying:
'Tis a monstrous Absurdity to suppose, that the Law is to be learnt by a perpetual copying of Precedents.
Either [they] have no Manner of Concern for their Clerk's future Welfare and
Prosperity... or must imagine, that he will attain to a competent Knowledge
in the Law ... by gazing on a Number of Books, which he has neither Time nor
Opportunity to read. ..

As if, in order to be fited for a Profession.

.

. a Man must devote himself to the

Servitude of Scribling eternally; a way of spending Time the most irksome and
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prenticeship as a means of instruction in law looked back to England, to a static corporate social order. Because the law taught was
fine-tuned to local circumstances, it suited early nineteenth-century New England, where local communities and local markets still
predominated.
Communal imperatives in fact conditioned both the social dimension and legal substance of Webster's early lawyering. Take,
for example, the documents concerning his pre-1807 debt collection practice, centering mainly in the area around Boscawen, New
Hampshire. 1 4 Statistics indicate that most of this practice took
place in the Court of Common Pleas, i.e., at the trial rather than
the appellate level of the state judicial system. 1 5 Almost eighty percent of the cases tried at this level dealt with debt collection and
promissory notes.'" A close look at the 216 civil cases shows that
Webster achieved a remarkable record 17
of success-sure evidence of
his mastery of the common law mode.

This legal system, the editors make clear, was a remarkably
intolerable to a young Gentleman of a thoughtful and studious Turn of Mind,
and introductive of a total Depression of Spirit.
[S]ervile Drudgery
Id. Quincy's critique, as the authors note, reflects much of Livingston's disdain, despite the
fact that Livingston's description was made in 1745 while Quincy's appeared almost one
hundred years later in 1832:
What copying of contracts! What filling of writs! What preparing of pleas! How
could the mind concentrate itself on principles...
Books were recommended as they were asked for, without any inquiry concerning the knowledge attained from the books previously recommended and read.
Regular instruction there was none; examination as to progress in acquaintance
with the law,-none; occasional lectures,-none; oversight as to general attention
and conduct,-none. The student was left to find his way by the light of his own
mind...
How could the great principles of the law ... take an early root ... by reading
necessarily desultory ... and mental exercises ... conducted, without excitement and without encouragement, with just so much vagrant attention as a
young man could persuade himself to give...
[C]ondemned ...
Id.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

89-137.
72 n.4.
73.
73-75.

to drudge[.]
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functional blend of the English-colonial legal inheritance and the
needs of nineteenth-century Americans on the New Hampshire
frontier.18 A balance was also struck in this legal system between a
rising individualism shaped by market values and a still-strong
sense of community interest. At the local level, for example, where
debts were small, merchants and traders were likely to be neighbors, if not friends. Debt collection rested on the fact that the rural
credit structure was a delicate network of mutually beneficial relationships. It followed that the main purpose of litigation was not to
establish liability, which was hard to disguise and generally admitted. Nor did Webster and his fellow lawyers press suits to exact
the last pound of flesh from the debtor. Docketing cases and obtaining nisi prius judgments, in fact, often were used to facilitate
arbitration and settlement out of court among parties bent on
avoiding nonpayment and economic collapse. 19 Merchants, traders,
and farmers, thrown together by the local market, recognized that
what hurt one tended to hurt all.2
Webster the young lawyer was part of this self-contained
world-a facilitator and preserver of communal values. These values, one must conclude from the documents presented, were connected primarily with property; with buying, selling, struggling for
a modest profit, and searching for the main chance.2 In assisting
his clients to exploit opportunity, Webster was called upon to
know the law of real property. He also had to be familiar with the
basic principles of contract which still centered around the common law actions of debt, covenant, and assumpsit.21 More than
that, he had to understand the general workings of capitalism in a
rural setting. Indeed, tracking Webster's legal footsteps in Boscawen reveals the extent to which market values permeated village
life, even if the market was local in nature.23 Seeing this system
through the documents-personal letters, business correspondence,
depositions, writs, and other legal forms-places capitalism in its
social setting and conveys a tangible sense of the law's impact on
18.
185-542
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id. at 61-182 (early nineteenth-century law practice in rural New England),
(Webster's Portsmouth practice).
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 90.
See id. at 296-332.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 89-137, 138-63.
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the lives of real people.2 4
III.
If Webster was a preserver of community interests during his
practice in Boscawen, he also was increasingly a representative of
forces which would transform that agrarian world and pull it into
the larger orbit of New England commerce. The same apparatus of
debt collection available to Boscawen businessmen also was available to coastal merchants in Portsmouth and Boston whose ventures reached out to embrace interior markets. 25 These entrepreneurs, as the editors make clear and "as Webster's practice shows,
were contemptuous of "country credit" and impatient with the accommodations which the law and lawyers made in order to prop up
the structure of rural credit.2
Webster was caught between two worlds: on the one hand,
personal and professional ties bound him to Boscawen; on the
other hand, proven ability and a growing reputation attracted him
to business interests in Portsmouth and Boston which could offer
him handsome fees and a chance to be on the cutting-edge of the
commercial-legal revolution that was underway. He did not resist
long. Like most of the outstanding lawyers of the early republic, he
was drawn willingly into the urban orbit of commercial capitalism-first in Portsmouth and then in Boston.
Portsmouth stood midway between Boscawen and Boston on
the scale of legal change underway in New England, and the editors do a commendable job of placing Webster in this new legal
setting. The "scope" of Webster's new practice is treated in chapter ten,27 and it is followed by a separate chapter devoted to "Procedure and Trial Practice" which includes a careful discussion of
special pleading, patterns of litigation, and the "posttrial phase" of
legal proceedings.28 Chapter twelve is devoted to documents and
editorial exposition on the "Substantive Acts of Practice": contracts and commercial law, the law of property, torts, family law
24. Id.
25. For a summary of the debt collection procedures then available, see id. at 82-88.
26. For an informative account of Webster's close dealings with one debtor, Moses
Lewis, and his representation on behalf of the Boston law firm, Gore, Miller & Parker, see
id. at 111-27.
27. Id. at 185-246.
28. Id. at 260-93.
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and maritime law as it was practiced in the common law courts
(especially the law governing masters and mariners).2 Contract
law, which was the substantive foundation of Webster's practice in
Portsmouth, is depicted as still looking mainly to the eighteenth
century.30 Considerations of fairness had not yet given way to fungibility, and the theory that the mere will of the parties was the
prime determinant in contract formation was still a half century
away. Equally revealing of the premodern condition of contract law
was the fact that there appeared to be little theorizing at all.31
Legal modernization was manifestly underway, however, in the
more highly structured commercial world of Boston, where Webster moved in 1816 and from which base he maintained his practice thereafter. Propelled by revolutionary developments in textile
manufacturing, Boston merchants, shippers, and insurers became
increasingly diversified and specialized as they tapped potential
national markets. Webster, as the documents show, felt compelled
to update his legal knowledge.32 General mercantile and property
law, staples of his rural practice, still stood him well in Boston, to
be sure. Increasingly, however, he moved into special areas of commercial law-particularly marine insurance, patents and corporations. 3
The documents in chapter six dealing with the "Substantive
Aspects of Webster's Boston Practice" illustrate this growing sophistication as well as the emergence of modern principles of contract law.3 ' Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court summed up the latter trend well in Revere v. Boston
Copper,5 when he noted that "the first and fundamental rule in
the construction of a contract, is to ascertain the meaning and in29. Id. at 296-517.
30. For a summary of basic contract actions and Webster's analysis of legal problems
involving contracts, see id. at 296-302.
31. Since most of Webster's contract cases "involved express or implied agreements
easily translated into the standard language of the common counts. . . ," there was "little
occasion for a legal analysis of contract formation, breach, or damages." Id. at 298.
32. Early in his legal career Webster began the habit of cataloguing his law library,
suggesting his intention to keep abreast of any changes in the law. For a listing of the books
in Webster's law library as of August 12, 1816, see 2 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 812.
33. Id. at 344.
34. See generally id. at 344-643.
35. 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 351 (1834). For a discussion of Boston Copper, see 2 KONFSKY
& KING, supra note 7, at 345.
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tent of the parties; and the second is, to look at every clause and
word of the instrument in which they have imbodied their contract, to ascertain that meaning.""6 Sentiment and "vague notions
of improvidence or inequality" 7 of the bargaining parties, he
warned, would not concern the court-or presumably the lawyers
either. What Boston's entrepreneurs wanted and what lawyer
Webster delivered to them was a contract law rooted in mercantile
needs and informed by mercantile practice, a law based on uniform
principles. Such law was more and more result-oriented and the
result desired was a legal environment where capital could be
deployed efficiently, rationally, and dependably over long distances
through various parties and agents.
IV.
The editors illustrate the process of legal modernization most
effectively in treating marine insurance, which was one of Webster's new specialties.38 From 1818 to 1827, Webster argued
nineteen marine insurance cases in the lower federal courts and
eleven such cases at the state level.39 Initially he appeared most
frequently for plaintiffs, but in 1831 he made a deliberate choice to
shift his practice so far as possible to the insurance companies because income from that side was "steadier." 40 The editors surmise
that Webster was retained by companies on a continuing basis in
order to prevent him from appearing against them.41 This practice
testified to Webster's stature as an attorney and prefigured his
well-known arrangement with Nicholas Biddle who had him under
permanent retainer for the Second Bank of the United States.42
It must not be inferred, of course, that merely because Webster was an elite lawyer he had a grand plan for the modernization
of New England commercial law. Theorizing was not in his temperament, and the case-by-case, day-by-day nature of lawyering mili36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
States
MOND,

Boston Copper, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) at 361.
Id. at 362.
2 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 415-24.
Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Whether Webster was effective in his lawyering for the Second Bank of the United
is another matter, and is doubted by at least one commentator. See, e.g., B. HAMBANKS AND POLMCS IN AMERCA 366-68 (1957).

828
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tated against long-range strategy. Still, Webster's working relationship with leading capitalists in New England put him in the
forefront of legal change, as the discussion of the marine insurance
case of Haven v. Holland5 is made to illustrate. This case arose on
an insurance policy underwritten on the ship Volant, which was
captured on March 23, 1813, by a British cruiser on a return voyage from Europe to New England. The question placed before the
court was whether the maneuvers of the Volant's captain, which to
some extent resulted in the capture and loss of the vessel on its
voyage home, constituted a deviation which released the underwriters from liability. The first stage of the litigation, which involved owners, shippers and insurers, was decided when Judge
Jackson of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in
favor of the insurers." The effect of his decision was to shift the
burden of loss to the owners and curtail the practical freedom of
ship captains in the interest of injecting certainty into marine insurance contracts.
Various efforts to overturn Judge Jackson's ruling ensued at
the state level4 5 before Webster entered the litigation in 1816 on
the side of the owners of the Volant. The owners were being sued
by the shippers on the ground that they were responsible for the
captain's decision which by Judge Jackson's ruling relieved the insurers of liability. Webster's strategy, which put him on the side of
modernization, was to circumvent the force of Judge Jackson's
state decision by filing a new diversity suit in Justice Story's federal circuit court sitting in Boston.46 Justice Story's ruling vindicated Webster's strategy. Where Judge Jackson had favored insurers by imposing strict construction of the contractual terms at the
expense of the owners, Justice Story shifted the burden to insurers,47 a position which at the same time permitted captains a wider
43. 11 F. Cas. 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821). Haven is considered extensively in 2 KONEvSKY
& KING, supra note 7, at 418-24.

44. Wiggin v. Amory, 13 Mass. 117 (1816).
45. 2 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 421-22.
46. Id. at 422.
47. See Haven, 11 F. Cas. at 847. The authors note that Justice Story's opinion reflected a concern for giving ship captains sufficient "discretion when confronted by a supposed enemy ship." 2 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 423. In Justice Story's own words:
"It would be most mischievous to the interests of trade to discourage a crew from making a
gallant defense by the knowledge that in no event could they reap a reward from the victory." Haven, 11 F. Cas. at 847.
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range of discretion in planning return voyages without running the
risk of deviating from the terms of insurance policies.
The Volant case is noteworthy because it does not conform to
simplistic notions of legal modernization. At first glance, Judge
Jackson appears to have been the champion of principled adjudication; Justice Story, the great champion of principled law (and presumably of corporate interest), favored owners over corporations
and flexibility over rigid principle. Webster, one might infer, was
more concerned with winning a single case for his clients than he
was in furthering scientific jurisprudence. Yet, in fact, both Webster and Justice Story were committed to the rationalization of insurance law in particular, and commerical contracts in general.
The key to the Volant case, as Professors Konefsky and King
make clear, was not the decision itself, but the strategy which
shifted the forum from the state to the federal court.4 8 Justice
Story's circuit court was well on its way to becoming the dominant
commercial law forum for the region; the editors' account of the
Justice's injection of actuarial precision into marine insurance ad49
judication makes the point nicely.
V.
Webster, for his part, fully understood the advantages of the
federal forum, and his remarkable working relationship with Justice Story-which garnered him expert legal advice from the Justice as well as suggestions about legal strategy, timely assistance in
drafting legislation and even political advice and drafts of
speeches-fortified his role as legal broker for New England capitalists5 ° The editors do not unduly emphasize the social founda48. 2 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 422.
49. Id. at 418. For an analysis of Justice Story's commanding position on the First Circuit Court of Appeals, see Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story on Circuit and a Neglected
Phase of American Legal History, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HST. 112 (1970).
50. Webster's close relationship with Justice Story is revealed in their correspondence
while collaborating in an effort to revive the federal bankruptcy system after its repeal in
1803. See, e.g., 2 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 278, 280-81, 300-01. An excerpt from
Webster's November 19, 1825 letter to Justice Story suggests Webster's desire that Justice
Story aid in the drafting of the bankruptcy legislation:
I regret not to have seen you, altho I have nothing very particular to communicate, I should feel greatly obliged to you, if in the multitude of your concerns,
you could find time to make a draft of a Bankrupt Law. I am pledged to do
something on that subject; & mean to bring it forward early in the Session. The
fewer the words in which the bill can be drawn the better....
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tions of Webster's practice, nor do they reduce it to a simple conspiracy, but their documents and analysis leave no doubt about the
matter. The point is made abundantly clear in a short chapter entitled "A Lawyer in Congress," which discusses Webster's legislative efforts on behalf of the Second Bank of the United States. 51
His elite connections are identified even more precisely in the
extended treatment of his role in the Spanish Claims Commission.5 2 The Commission was created as a result of the Adams-Onis
Treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain.53 Articles IX
and XI aimed to settle the outstanding claims between the two
countries, including those arising from unlawful seizures made by
Spain of American vessels since the 1790s." New England shippers
turned to Webster to represent them, as the editors point out, because of his "reputation as a commercial and corporate lawyer"
and because he was "sound, cautious, politically safe, and well
known." 55 Webster's role as legal spokesman for New England business leaders, a motif of his general practice, is now made explicit.
The list of Webster's connections, in fact, "is a who's who of the
early nineteenth century
commercial elite of New England, and
5' ' 6
particularly of Boston.
VI.
That Webster was a lawyer for the rich and powerful is not, of
course, an original or all-sufficient notion. What is missing and
what these volumes permit us to understand is how and why Webster the lawyer made it to the top-and to some extent the price
he paid for the trip. In this regard the Boscawen and Portsmouth
experiences are no less revealing than his dazzling efforts in the
great Supreme Court cases. Even at this early stage, one is struck
with the sheer power of Webster's intellect and with the force of
his personality. Above all, we sense his genius for making law serve
the practical needs of his clients-and of Daniel Webster. The legal profession, if one judges from Webster's career, readily assumes
Id. at 280 (emphasis original).
51. Id. at 276-325.
52. Id. at 175-275.
53. Id. at 175-77.
54. Id. at 176.
55. Id. at 199.
56. Id. at 265.
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the ideological coloration of the groups it serves, which is to say
that Webster and his professional colleagues were pragmatic, result-oriented and profit-minded. Webster, like the business elite he
represented, wanted power, money and the good life. Indeed, Webster's professional zeal seemed to have been connected directly to
the penury of his family, the early "specter of financial distress." 57
On October 26, 1801, for example, he conveyed the "most unpleasant information""8 to his friend Bingham concerning his family's
economic woes: "It mortifies me, beyond expression," he declared,
"to relinquish my study at this period; but I cannot, cannot help it!
Necessity is unrelenting and imperious."5 9 The lessons it teaches
also are apt to be. permanent, and Webster was a quick learner in
this as in other things. "Cash," he wrote to his brother and confidant Ezekiel in regard to his decision to study law in Boston, "of
all things of a perishable nature, is worth the most-it [deserves?]
the most toil. It ever did, does & ever will constitute the real, unavoidable aristocracy that exists & must exist in Society." 0
Too much can be made of a single statement from a hungry
and ambitious young lawyer, of course, and the editors prudently
abjure grand speculations. The search for money (and the inability
to manage it) is, however, a constant theme of Webster's life. It
attracted him into the profession and dictated his decision to
study in Boston and ultimately to move there in pursuit of riches
and fame. Webster, this is to suggest, not only served the members
of the rising economic classes of New England, but was in his basic
aspirations and values one of them. It quite naturally followed that
he should be under permanent retainer to Biddle; that his clients
came from the rich and well-born. It followed, too, that when Webster lost his life savings in the land bust of 1837, the capitalists of
Boston and New York should have passed the hat (to the tune of
$100,000) in order to keep him in the Senate.6 1 Webster, it would
57. 1 KONEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 10.
58. Letter from Daniel Webster to James Hervey Bingham (Oct. 26, 1801) in 1 KoNEFSKY & KING, supra note 7, at 10.
59. Id.
60. Letter from Daniel Webster to Ezekiel Webster (May 5, 1804) in 1 KONEFsKY &
KING, supra note 7, at 24.
61. Letter from Charles Sumner to Joseph Story (Feb. 5, 1845) (available in Houghton
Library, Harvard University). Sumner wrote of the "terms" on which Webster settled with
"his friends, before he consented to be chosen [to the Senate]. They were $50,000 to be
subscribed in Boston, & the same sum in N York to be settled on his life & that of his wife."
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seem, was retained politically by the same group that retained him
professionally. When Webster spoke for New England interests in
the House and Senate, the detailed knowledge acquired in his profession added to his persuasiveness; when he appeared in court, his
political reputation gave authority to his arguments. It was this inimitable mixture of law and policy that was, in fact, Webster's
hallmark as a constitutional lawyer.
The format of these volumes does not permit Professors
Konefsky and King to explore the relationship of Webster's private
law practice to his constitutional lawyering or his political career.
The connection is there to be made, however, which is to say that
this definitive collection of Webster's private law sources never
loses sight of Webster the man. Future biographers will be grateful
for this scholarly collection as will historians who want to understand the methodology and substance of early national law.

Id. See also Letter from Harrison G. Otis to G. Harrison (Feb. 7, 1845) (available in Massachusetts Historical Society). Otis also mentioned a "fund" of $100,000, and noted that this
was the third time "that the wind has been raised for him." Id.

